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Abstract
This thesis discusses Spain's overall public opinion around immigration, exploring factors
that contribute to the development of a country's attitude toward its immigrants. Spain
exemplifies a particularly distinctive attitude in relation to its European Mediterranean
counterparts, displaying an increased receptiveness toward its immigrant population. I examine
economic factors, studying whether or not perceived economic competition can lead to
significantly increased negativity toward immigrants. However, I find that, specifically regarding
the Spanish case, economic competition does not determine the country's attitude toward
immigration. Therefore, I focus on this element of authoritarian legacy and its contribution to
public opinion around immigration. Following an extensive discussion on Franco's authoritarian
regime and Spain's recent transition to democracy, I suggest that the increased receptiveness in
Spain could likely be attributed to the country's recent history of dictatorship.
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Introduction
During my time studying abroad in the city of Seville, located in the south of Spain, I
decided to spend one of my weekends traveling to Morocco and exploring the captivating culture
in various Moroccan cities. While crossing the border from Morocco back into Ceuta, Spain, a
city owned by Spain that resides in Africa, I noticed numerous Moroccan children attempting to
crawl underneath the bus in which I was riding in an attempt to illegally cross the border into
Spain. This incident led me to research precisely why it was that so many children desired to
leave Morocco and reach Spain. In my searching, I discovered the name of a rescue ship, called
the Aquarius, that was found off the coast of Libya in North Africa in the summer of 2018. This
rescue ship was turned away from Italy, then Malta, until it was finally granted access to a
Spanish port. Come to find out, Spain’s increased receptiveness was not a mere single
occurrence; rather, studies show that this positive attitude toward immigration has been more
abundant in this new Spanish democracy in recent years in comparison with its Mediterranean
counterparts in Europe.
Research Question
The international community is becoming increasingly interconnected, and a key cause is
the incessant flow of migration. I evaluate what factors develop public sentiment toward
migration, focusing specifically on the case of immigration in Spain. In comparison to other
Mediterranean countries in Europe––France, Greece, Italy, Malta, and Portugal––Spain has a
higher positive sentiment toward immigrants. I ask the following questions: Why do attitudes
toward immigration vary? What makes one country more prone to be receptive toward
immigrants? I examine the trajectory of this sentiment in Spain, hypothesize the factors that
account for this, and discuss whether this distinctive attitude will last.
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Rationale
Immigration and public opinion toward immigrants have always been important topics in
a consistently globalizing world. As Duffy and Frere-Smith (2014) point out, one of the most
researched areas within public policy are the attitudes toward immigration (Duffy & FrereSmith, 2014). Determining what shapes public sentiment toward immigration is an interesting
facet of immigration to study, and this study focuses specifically on a couple interesting and
important variables likely contributing to the formation of public opinion. The International
Organization for Migration (IOM) provides data on Mediterranean migrant arrivals from various
years, and when examining the number of migrants by sea coming into Spain in 2017 compared
to 2016, there was a significant increase. However, its fellow EU counterparts, Greece and Italy,
each saw a clear decrease (International Organization for Migration, 2018). The aforementioned
incident with the rescue ship, the Aquarius, provides an exemplary representation of the
seemingly more receptive nature of Spain in comparison with surrounding EU countries. The
ship consisted of 630 migrants rescued off the coast of Libya who arrived at the Spanish port of
Valencia after dealing with a long seven days at sea and being dismissed from both Italy and
Malta; not to mention, the previous couple of days prior to the incident Spain had rescued 933
individuals attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe (Jones, 2018). This raises
the question as to why Spain sees this unique increase, and, consequently, leads us to question if
and why immigration is viewed more positively in Spain. Therefore, this study ultimately
provides crucial information about what shapes outlooks on immigration.
Theoretical Framework
Immigration continues to be one of the most prominent political issues in Europe
following the European migration crisis in 2015. Human migration is the movement of
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individuals or groups to a new geographical location with the intent of resettling, either
temporarily or permanently, and migrants are social actors that choose to relocate themselves on
the basis of traditional beliefs, cultural expectations, and social practices (Cohen & Sirkeci
2011). In seeking to develop a more all-encompassing definition of migration, apart from the
United Nations’ traditionally accepted definition as “movement from point A to point B for at
least 12 months,” Cohen and Sirkeci (2011) describe migration as mobility, which lends itself to
a representation of fluid progression. Furthermore, migration can be understood as a cultural
process that is rationalized (Cohen & Sirkeci 2011).
The overarching theme on which my research is based is the concept of public opinion,
specifically in regards to immigration. As Tourangeau and Galešić (2008) point out, while some
believe that an attitude becomes an opinion as we unload the evaluation from an attitude, others
claim that opinions resemble that of specific manifestations of the more general underlying
attitudes. Furthermore, these attitudes seemingly vary distinctly over time and “in response to
transient conditions” (Tourangeau & Galešić, 2008). In terms of the formation of attitudes in
regards to immigration, however, Hoskin (1991) argues that the influx of new incoming migrants
are likely to “strain the capabilities of the host” country, in turn conjuring up adverse effects on
both the social attitudes and policies of the host country (Hoskin, 1991). However, in the case of
Spain, despite increasing numbers of immigrants flooding the country, these public attitudes do
not appear to turn negative, and Spain has been welcoming of refugee rescue ships like the
Aquarius. This is the puzzle I am striving to solve, and I do so by specifically examining the
economy’s relationship to immigration, as well as the emergence of extreme right-wing political
parties and how a system of government plays a key role in immigration.
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Many studies show that immigration is driven by economic interests, and perceived
economic competition leads to increased negativity toward immigrants (Dennison & Drazanová,
2018). Borjas (1994) uses evidence provided by economic research to frame and formulate the
discussion of immigration, arguing that immigrants who have high levels of productivity and
adapt rapidly to conditions in the host country’s labor market can make a significant contribution
to economic growth; therefore, natives do not need to be concerned about the impact of
immigration on its host economy (Borjas, 1994). Hoskin (1991) principally argues that
immigration is most fundamentally an economic phenomenon, but her analysis of individual
economic opinions suggests that economic factors alone are insufficient for comprehensively
explaining public reaction to immigrants (Hoskin, 1991). Hence I seek to explore this wrinkle in
the research by evaluating authoritarian legacies.
In the case of Spain, I explore the history of Franco’s authoritarian regime to better
comprehend how Spain’s attitude toward migration has developed. The history of an
authoritarian regime can lead to a number of repercussions within a society, likely dependent
upon the way in which the transition to democracy occurs. Construction of new democracies
consists of a rupture with the past and establishes a break from the repressive, non-democratic
past by shifting patterns of social and political inclusion and exclusion, allowing the voices of the
victims to be legitimated and the repression to be condemned (Pinto, 2010). While there could
likely be a strong power of the authoritarian incumbents that remains, such “traumas derived
from civil confrontations and the desire that these should never happen again” have left a lasting
impression in post-authoritarian political culture (Cesarini & Hite, 2004). Therefore, public
opinion in post-authoritarian societies is likely characterized as a sharp contrast from the
repressed sentiments seen amidst the authoritarian regimes.
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Research Design
The specific case I study is Spain, and I observe its migration trends alongside various
other European Mediterranean countries. This is an explanatory multiple-case study with specific
emphasis on the case of Spain. I examine why Spain’s public sentiment toward immigrants
appears distinctly positive, studying variables like economic satisfaction and authoritarian legacy
for Spain and the various other Mediterranean countries. Furthermore, I examine the effects of
the emergence of radical right-wing political parties on a country’s public attitude toward
immigration.
Case Selection
I study Spain for a number of reasons. Spain is a European Mediterranean country that
deals with a heavy inflow of immigrants, yet unlike other European Mediterranean countries, I
note that Spain’s public attitude toward these migrants appears to be increasingly positive. Not
only does the incident with the Aquarius rescue ship illustrate Spain’s receptive attitude, but as
will be seen, public opinion surveys demonstrate Spain’s distinctively positive demeanor toward
immigrants. Moreover, I have chosen to focus on the case of Spain with its rich and recent
history of authoritarian government, and the country has also dealt with economic hardships,
specifically from the economic crisis of 2008. Additionally, Spain’s geographical proximity to
North African countries, which account for a large number of migrants flocking to Europe in
search of a better life, makes Spain an ideal country to examine in regards to attitude toward
immigrants. Many immigrants also come from Latin American countries because of the shared
language and similar culture, as well as other EU countries due to proximity and easy access.
In addition to Spain, the other European Mediterranean countries that I look at are
France, Greece, Italy, Malta, and Portugal. Among these countries, some exemplify recent
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histories of authoritarian regimes, while others represent old democracies. Greece, Portugal, and
Spain are more recent post-authoritarian societies, whereas France, Italy, and Malta represent
older democracies. Although Portugal is not geographically located along the Mediterranean Sea,
it is considered a Mediterranean country because of its similar culture and climate, and it is
important to study this country due to the many similarities it shares with Spain in addition to its
geographical proximity to Spain.
Furthermore, Spain is an outlier case in terms of outward sentiment toward its
immigrants. Unlike some of its European neighbors, Spain’s public opinion toward immigrants
has not yet taken a vividly negative turn. This research can contribute to understanding what
shapes public sentiment toward migration.
Variables and Hypothesis
My dependent variable that I am studying is public sentiment toward migration, which I
will measure using public opinion surveys/polls in order to demonstrate Spain’s distinctive
demeanor. Additionally, I seek to refute the claim that attitudes toward immigrants within a
country should be determined by the national economic situation, negating a correlation between
the number of immigrants in a country and the level of satisfaction with the national economy. I
look at public opinion surveys that project the satisfaction in the national economy, comparing
them alongside migration trends for each country. Furthermore, I suggest that Spain’s
receptiveness toward immigrants and more positive public opinion is a result of the recent postauthoritarian Franco regime. I hypothesize not only that post-authoritarian societies tend to have
more positive views toward immigrants, but also that Spain is particularly distinct in its higher
tolerance of immigration due to the way in which Spain transitioned from its dictatorship to
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democracy. Therefore, this is why I will examine Mediterranean countries with both histories of
recent authoritarian regimes and old democracies.
Data and Method
My data consists of statistics from the World Bank, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
for determining migration patterns. Additionally, I use public opinion surveys, like those from
the Pew Research Center and Eurobarometer, as a means to evaluate public sentiment toward
immigration and satisfaction in the state of the national economy. I also examine public opinion
reports from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas to determine attitudes toward
immigrants in Spain in particular.
The World Bank provides data on international immigrants as a percentage of the
population from 1990 to 2015 for France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain. Spain has a
larger percent of immigrants in 2015 (the year of the onset of the European migrant crisis)
compared to the other European Mediterranean countries. I will study differences in migration
trends between Spain and the other European Mediterranean countries, and I will look for
correlations between migration patterns and attitude toward immigration, in addition to economic
and political variables. I will also look for correlations between higher levels of migrants coming
in and the public sentiment found in Spain at that time through public opinion polls.
The United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees, or UNHCR, provides data
regarding the sea and land arrivals of refugees in Spain since 2014, as well as demographics of
these refugees. I will use this data to further observe migration patterns of the quantity of arrivals
relocating to Spain throughout recent years. I can compare the information I gather from this
source to Spain’s economy. I will continue to also look for correlations between higher levels of
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migrants coming into Spain and the public sentiment found from public opinion surveys at
designated times.
The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, or UN DESA, provides
statistics up until the year 2019 in regards to the migrant stock of each country as a percentage of
the total population. Therefore, I use this database to examine migration trends as well.
Many countries with a large influx of immigrants face an anti-immigration backlash, yet
Spain appears distinct. I will use the public opinion surveys provided by the Pew Research
Center, Eurobarometer, and the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas to assess the determined
sentiment toward migration and connect this with my observation and analysis of the migration
trends throughout these Mediterranean countries in Europe.
The Pew Research Center conducts public opinion surveys, and I will observe some of
their surveys regarding public opinion toward migration in order to draw conclusions. One
survey in particular assesses the percentage of which specific European nations say that
immigrants today make our country stronger because of their work and talents, determining how
the attitudes have shifted from 2014 to 2018. This survey determines the statistically significant
differences, highlighting Spain’s increasingly positive sentiment toward immigrants. Another
survey conducted by the Pew Research Center evaluates the percentage of support versus
opposition of a number of specific European countries, demonstrating Spain’s heightened sense
of support for welcoming refugees migrating to escape violence and war. These surveys assess
the public sentiment of Spain as well as various other countries, and gauging such surveys
supports my assessment of a distinctive, positive public opinion toward migrants coming into
Spain.
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Eurobarometer conducts a variety of public opinion surveys within the EU two times per
year, and from 1990 onward, I have found various public opinion surveys that represent the
satisfaction in the state of the national economy. Furthermore, some of Eurobarometer’s public
opinion reports in the EU offer perceptions on immigration in Europe, such as the percentage of
the population in each country that view immigration as a primary issue, which is valuable to my
research in determining what public sentiment toward immigration has looked like in the latetwentieth century.
The Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, or CIS, is a database specific to information
found in Spain. Thus, I use reports from the CIS that evaluate the overall Spanish attitude toward
its immigrants.
My methodology centers primarily on existing survey data, like that of public opinion
surveys, compared alongside migration trends. I observe the relationship between the migrant
stock as a percentage of the total population for each country with the percentage of each
country’s satisfaction with the national economy. I do so in order to discredit anti-immigrant
sentiment based on economic suffering, dismissing a correlation between the number of
immigrants in a given country and the country’s economic satisfaction, given that some like to
accredit increasing immigrants with the causation of their country’s economic hardships.
Furthermore, in examining public opinion reports around immigration, I find that Spain is
distinctly positive in its attitude toward its immigrants. Therefore, I construct an argument to
explain non-quantifiable elements of this distinctive attitude, suggesting that Spain’s lingering
authoritarian legacy from its recent and unique transition to democracy has lent itself to an
increased receptiveness of immigrants.
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Chapter Outline
Chapter II focuses on my case study by providing background on the political history of
Spain, detailing Spain’s rich history from the onset of the Spanish Civil War to the reemergence
of right-wing political parties seen in recent years. Chapter III serves to develop my theoretical
framework, discussing immigration’s relationship with both the system of government and the
economy, with a specific emphasis on the relationships found in Spain. Furthermore, this chapter
touches on the influence of public opinion on immigration in a country. Chapter IV provides my
data and analysis, including my hypothesis testing along with observations and conclusions, and
my overall concluding remarks are summed up in Chapter V.
In my research and the execution of this thesis, my goal is to add to existing knowledge
about immigration in Spain in the context of its authoritarian past in order to develop a better
understanding of the formation of public opinion around immigration.
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Chapter II
Political History of Spain: The Evolution of Migration Patterns in Spain
Introduction
In recent years, in light of the financial crisis, many Europeans accredit the economic
issues that Europe as a whole has seen to the mass influx of migrants that have flooded into the
continent. This public sentiment translates to an emphasis on immigration within each country’s
political agenda. Consequently, numerous countries throughout Europe have seen a rise in rightwing political parties that promote anti-immigration policies, such as the National Front in
France and the Northern League in Italy. However, Spain has not dealt with strong antiimmigrant rhetoric, given that the country has lacked a monumental uproar of right-wing
political ideologies that push for intense anti-immigrant agendas. The lack of prevalent antiimmigrant rhetoric cannot be attributed to a flourishing economy, however, since Spain’s
economy has actually been facing many economic struggles. Furthermore, this Mediterranean
country houses many immigrants, being one of the larger immigrant destinations within Europe.
This presents a perplexing puzzle and leads us to question why Spain continues to exhibit
increased receptiveness toward its immigrant population in comparison with the surrounding
European Mediterranean countries.
In order to attempt to solve this perplexing puzzle, it is important to examine the history
of Spain within the past century. Starting with the tumultuous Spanish Civil War in the late
1930s that ended with the infamous dictatorship under Francisco Franco, dominating the country
for over thirty years, this chapter covers the political history of Spain throughout its fairly recent
democratic transition up until the present. Better understanding the historical context behind
what kept Spain from becoming a consolidated democracy until relatively recent years can
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contribute crucial information to help develop a better idea of precisely why the public opinion
around immigration within the country currently demonstrates such a distinctive character
relative to its European Mediterranean counterparts.
The Spanish Civil War and Transition to the Authoritarian Regime
Spain certainly has not always been a country characterized by such receptiveness of
immigrants, exhibiting such a high and growing percentage of its immigrant population. This
Mediterranean country has evolved from being a country of emigration, developing into a net
receiver of immigrants in the early 1980s. Emigration from Spain at the beginning of the 20th
century was primarily focused on South America due to the crisis in European agriculture in
addition to the growth experienced in these destination countries. However, World War I and the
Spanish Civil War halted this trend. The flow of emigration picked up again in 1960 with over
100,000 workers emigrating from Spain to other European countries like Germany, France, and
Switzerland in order to escape the excess supply of labor in Spain (Bover & Velilla, 1999).
While emigration ceased to be significant in 1973, it was not until the early 1980s when Spain
transformed into a country of immigration. This timeline brings into question the intriguing
possible causal factor of the shift of migration patterns within the country, the long-lived and
repressive authoritarian regime that governed the country for over thirty years, which will be
discussed in the subsequent section. Prior to turning into a country marked by such a tyranny,
however, Spain was characterized by prominent political division that led the country to its
devastating civil war.
The Spanish Civil was born out of a strong polarization between the Spanish people that
had been gradually developing within the country over a number of decades. Spain had become a
very weak country, having lost nearly all of its colonies following its defeat in the Spanish-
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American War of 1898. Furthermore, following the end of World War I, Spain suffered major
economic issues, despite being neutral during the war, because it had close economic ties with
the countries at war. Such economic hardships included a lack of stability of prices, leading to
inflation and effects on workers’ wages. These adversities impacted the working class greatly,
and the Communists often backed these suffering groups. With a looming fear of Communism
spreading throughout the world as a result of the Russian Revolution of 1917, the elite and
middle classes that dominated the economy were concerned that a Communist revolution could
occur in Spain. Therefore, a military coup instilled Miguel Primo de Rivera as dictator in 1923.
However, the country under his leadership did not reform in favor of the poor, so tensions
throughout the country escalated. Consequently, the monarchy ended in 1931, seemingly
creating opportunity for democratic transition.
The Second Republic commenced under a new liberal constitution; however, political
instability continued to ravage the country. The country was still divided between the
Nationalists––the conservative group on the right side of the political spectrum that consisted
primarily of the elite and middle classes––and the Republicans––the leftist group that
predominantly represented the working class. The country faced widespread labor conflict, and
troops led by General Francisco Franco suppressed workers’ uprisings. The left-wing
government that governed the country at this time was extremely weak, and it ultimately failed
due to the inability of the differing Spanish political parties to reach a compromise and uphold
democratic values. The Nationalist and Republican forces worked to oppress one another, each
designating their own respective territories and operating by means of violence. They each set up
their own governments in the fall of 1936, with General Franco as the leader of the Nationalist
forces.
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Ultimately, there were a variety of factors that caused Spain to break out into a civil war,
and the tension that had been manifesting for a number years led to a downright utterly
devastating war that absolutely wrecked the country. In the midst of a multitude of socioeconomic problems, the country failed to reach a respectable compromise, and political violence
and extreme instability desolated Spain. Therefore, the failed Second Republic that shaped the
context for this bloody civil war generated the gateway for the repressive Nationalist forces
under General Francisco Franco to rise to power. As his Nationalist forces claimed victory in the
spring of 1939, Francisco Franco became dictator, constructing a country characterized by
persecution of his political opponents. He governed the oppressive authoritarian regime for
decades, up until his death in 1975.
Life under Franco’s Dictatorship
Marking the end of the Second Republic and its attempt at democracy, Franco’s
dictatorship initiated in 1936 at the onset of the Spanish Civil War and was one of the longestlived dictatorships in European history. While the dictatorship created long-awaited order and
unity in the country, it was also characterized by extreme repression and lack of freedoms.
As the Spanish Civil War wound down and the Republicans began to see the Nationalist
victory on the horizon, many of the Republicans fled the country, and for those who remained,
they were tried at military tribunals, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Republicans. At the
mercy of the newly installed dictator, Franco, thousands of political prisoners were detained.
Hence, the repressive dictatorship commenced.
The repressive regime was characterized by a number of restrictive regulations enacted
by Franco in his attempt to restore Spain from profound polarization by cultivating intense
nationalistic pride throughout the country. Such laws included: establishing Catholicism as the
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only accepted religion, forbidding speaking of regional languages like Basque and Catalan,
prohibiting labor unions, fostering policies of economic self-sufficiency, and developing an
organization of secret police who were used to spy on citizens. Therefore, this vast era of
authoritarianism in Spain was extremely limited in its available liberties to offer its citizens and
prospective immigrants.
Spain was historically a country of emigration rather than immigration up until the 1980s.
Under Franco’s dictatorship, the country continued to be an exporter rather than importer of
immigrants. Approximately six million Spaniards left Spain throughout the course of the
twentieth-century, and while about eighty percent of migrating Spaniards moved to the Americas
throughout the 1930s, seventy-four percent between the 1950s and 1970s left for northern
Europe due to labor demand and a growing availability of guest workers’ programs in countries
like France, Germany, and Switzerland (Encarnación, 2004). Regardless of the destination, it is
evident that many Spanish citizens were seeking homes outside of Spain throughout Franco’s
dictatorship. Immigration was not a salient issue under the authoritarian regime, with more
people desiring to emigrate and escape the lack of freedoms that characterized the repressive
regime.
The End of the Dictatorship and Transition to Democracy
Consolidation of democracy in Spain did not take place until more recent years during the
third wave of democracy, so the country is characterized as having one of the newer democracies
of the European community. Furthermore, Spain did not follow the same path in its transition
from authoritarianism as countries like Greece, Italy, and Portugal. As Omar Encarnación (2008)
puts it, Spain’s process of democratization represents ‘the most famous case in recent history of a
new democracy dealing with a difficult and painful past by choosing not to deal with it at all’
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(Encarnación, 2008). While the consolidation of democracy in countries like Greece, Italy, and
Portugal consisted of purges and retroactive measures, Spain took a differing approach to its
transition. Transitional justice and ruptures from the previous administration characterized the
democratic transitions in Greece, Italy, and Portugal, whereas persistence of an informal pact
between the two major parties that agreed to ignore the past characterized newly-democratic
Spain for many years (Pinto, 2010). While Greece and Portugal both transitioned to democracy
during the third wave of democratization like Spain, they did not have the same fortune as Spain.
Spain had an evolutionary path to democracy, modeling a successful and peaceful transition with
no civil war or revolutionary overthrow, and the country’s cooperation between leaders coupled
with growing economic development pathed the way for a smooth transition (Bailey, 2007). The
Spanish transition was marked by continuity, likely playing a distinctive role in the way in which
its authoritarian legacy has been translated in modern day society.
While the fall of the dictatorship did not officially occur until the death of the dictator
Francisco Franco in November of 1975, the first real hint at a democratic transition could be seen
at the Munich Convention in 1962. This event marked a symbolic representation of the
emergence of the opposition against the regime and in favor of democracy, given that most of the
opposition groups gathered at this convention (O’Donnell, et al., 1986). However, the
authoritarian regime did not truly lose its stronghold until the death of Franco, and Franco’s
chosen successor as head of state, King Juan Carlos I, soon after ignited the process of
democratic transition that took down Franco’s system within three years and established a
democratic constitution. Spain was then declared a constitutional monarchy, characterized by the
separation of powers between the three branches––executive, legislative, and judicial––and the
fundamental values of freedom, justice, equality, and political pluralism. Therefore, a democratic
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constitutional monarchy was ultimately made possible thanks to institutional mechanisms created
by Franco in an effort to uphold the dictatorial system (Bailey, 2007).
Given the various human rights violations and the repressive nature of the authoritarian
regime under Francisco Franco, it is not surprising that a majority of the surveys that were
conducted during the period of time immediately following the death of Franco in 1975
displayed a growing support for a democratic system of government, a trend that was especially
prevalent amidst those who belonged in the middle classes and those who were educated
(O’Donnell, et. al, 1986). However, Spain did not carry out a systematic and calculated policy to
get rid of the opposition; rather, some members of the police and the national guard continued to
carry out isolated acts of torture. This was one of the consequences of the country’s decision to
neglect taking measures to clean out the previous administration (Aguilar & Hite, 2004). Spain
did not clear out its army as did Greece, Italy, and Portugal during their democratic transitions,
and Spain’s democracy, sprouting from within the regime under Franco’s successor, exhibited
continuities throughout (Agüero, 1995). This facet of democratic transition is important when
analyzing the country’s distinctive authoritarian legacy, given that a democratic shift
characterized by an array of continuities from its previous authoritarian regime leads to stronger,
more salient legacies (Hite & Morlino, 2004). Civil and military institutions in Spain were not
cleared out, and human rights violations from the Franco regime were not under any sort of
investigation, with no trials hosted to persecute the individuals who held responsibility for
deaths, torture, and illegal detentions found under the dictatorship (Aguilar & Hite, 2004). This
undeniably calls to question the strength and reliability of the newly constructed democracy. The
authoritarian legacy consequently resonates stronger with the Spaniards since the proper
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opportunity to accept and come to terms with the repressive past was denied. Having been
negligent in facing its past, this past likely persists and remains close to the Spanish.
In 1977, the Amnesty Law of October 1977 was passed by a democratically elected
parliament, receiving full support from each of the principal political parties. This law granted
amnesty for the political prisoners of the democratic opposition; however, interestingly enough,
this amnesty was also extended to the perpetrators from the regime, granting protection against
any criminal chargers to those who had committed human rights abuses during the dictatorship
(Pinto, 2010). The country lacked any sort of reparative measures, failing to enact any judicial
acts to prosecute the repressive torturers of the Franco era; rather, Franco’s party dissolved in a
peaceful manner, and approximately 30,000 officials that served underneath Franco were
transferred to civil service underneath the newly-formed democratic government (Alba, 1995).
It was not until nearly thirty years after the democratic transition when a left-wing party
began to take action, and in 2004, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, PSOE, under José Luis
Rodríguez Zapatero’s leadership, sparked reparation laws (Aguilar Fernández, 2009). One law in
particular that eventually came to fruition, deemed the 2007 Law of Reparation, was also
referred to as the ‘Law of Historical Memory’, and this law finally reopened decade-old wounds
of Spain’s thirty-year old dictatorship and addressed the looming legacy of the country’s
authoritarian past (Pinto, 2010).
All in all, the Spanish transition to democracy proves to be a distinct case in the way in
which the country as a whole neglected to confront its past or implement disciplinary justice
procedures for years, and the principal political parties abided by this notion that the
authoritarian past should be forgotten instead of remembered. Spain serves as a model
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democratic transition, however, given the evolutionary rather than revolutionary way in which it
shifted.
Present Day Politics and the Rise of the Right
Spain has only very recently seen a resurgence of extremist right-wing political ideology
with the election of the Vox party into the parliament of Andalusia, an autonomous region of
Spain located in the south. The socialist party, PSOE, had claimed victory for the previous 36
years, but this region of Spain in particular has exhibited a possible shift to more conservative
priorities with the evident support of a radical right-wing party for the first time since the fall of
Franco’s dictatorship (Villaverde, 2018). However, the support for Vox comes primarily from a
population of employed or retired citizens 65 and older, whereas the student and unemployed
population of this region provide minimal support to the party, with a majority of the 18 to 29
age group desiring that the liberal party PSOE maintain power in the Andalusian parliament
(Llaneras, 2018). Therefore, given that the majority of support for an anti-immigrant party
derives from an aging population, this support is unlikely to hold significant weight in the longrun.
However, with increasing political instability that has persisted in recent years from
growing separatist movements in Spain’s northern region of Catalonia amidst the region’s
attempt to gain independence from Spain, the Vox party has seen more electoral success. Vox, a
party grounded in authoritarian conservativism and nationalism, promotes ideals that resemble
that of France’s National Front party, such as its strict policies toward immigration. This
extremist right-wing party in Spain advocates for deportation of all undocumented immigrants
and immigrants who commit any crimes, and it is working to eliminate social policies that aid in
attracting immigrants (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019). Given that political unrest is growing in the
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country with the rise of separatist movements, citizens may seek help from Vox, a party rooted in
Spanish nationalism that calls for an end to Catalan movements toward autonomous
independence, in an effort to restore political stability to the country.
Conclusion
Spain is a country that has dealt with a recent history of changes, both politically and
economically. Given that the country has recently seen an end to the authoritarian regime under
Franco and is, thus, a relatively new democracy, a sense of repression that the regime established
called for eventual change in the country. However, Spain represents a peculiar case in which the
authoritarian legacy was not addressed until much later in time, desiring to at last establish a
sense of harmony and consensus in the country after having dealt with decades marked by either
the polarizing Spanish Civil War or the oppressive Franco dictatorship. Nonetheless, migration
patterns immediately following the end of the dictatorship showed a clear shift from patterns of
emigration to immigration. It has not been until the last few years that Spain has seen a strong
reemergence of the extremist right-wing parties, specifically Vox, which is characterized by a
political agenda with strong anti-immigrant rhetoric. Therefore, Spain’s increased receptiveness
toward immigrants may start to take a turn in the overall Spanish public opinion.
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Chapter III
Economic and Political Links to Immigration and the Role of Public Opinion
Introduction
Immigration did not become a relevant concern to the Spanish political agenda until
recently, given that migration patterns prior to the end of the Franco dictatorship consisted
primarily of emigration. The period in Spain defined by emigration to other European countries
did not end until the end of the Franco dictatorship in the mid 1970s and the global economic
recession of the late 1970s, which limited the ability of Spaniards’ destination countries, like
France and Germany, to give home to those seeking work abroad. Furthermore, Spain finally
became a member of the European Community in 1986 and experienced an economic boom
throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s, drawing those who had previously sought work
abroad to come back to Spain (Encarnación, 2004).
At its core, migration is caused by a variety of both push factors––that which is occurring
within the migrant’s country of origin––and pull factors––what happens in the migrant’s country
of destination––both of which are affected by economic, environmental, political, and social
factors. According to migration and citizenship data from Eurostat, since the European Union
has remained relatively economically prosperous and politically stable throughout its history,
many immigrants have thus felt such pull effects and been drawn to migrate to countries within
the EU (Eurostat, 2019). Therefore, the European Union offers a worthy representation of the
connection between immigration and economic and political aspects. This fact demonstrates why
such an emphasis has been placed on the relationship between both the political climate and the
economic situation of the destination country in regards to immigration. Furthermore,
immigration has arisen in the political agenda in recent years in Southern European countries,
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and in the case of Spain, this recent shift from a country of emigration to a country of
immigration can be attributed to processes such as the political transition from an authoritarian
regime to a democracy and the transformation of the economic structure of the country (Moreno,
2004). Thus, the following chapter looks in depth at the relationship between a country’s system
of government and immigration, as well as the relationship between a country’s economic state
and immigration, with a special emphasis on Spain and how the factors are interlinked. The
chapter concludes by examining the overall role of public opinion on immigration, emphasizing
the importance of the public’s attitude in generating immigration policy.
Relationship between the System of Government and Immigration
The type of political system in place in a designated country naturally affects its policies
around immigration. Thus, it is important to take into account the type of government in place in
order to understand a country’s policy and overall general attitude toward immigration. The
system of government in a given country affects supply of immigrants and demand for
immigrants, and migrants ultimately pursue democratic countries, seeking out countries with
electoral competition, noncitizen rights, constraints against deportation, and constraints against
regulating marriage (Mirilovic, 2010). Even if a dictatorship is open to immigrants, migrants
tend to flock toward democratic systems of government with hopes to attain the privileges and
liberties that are associated with democracies.
Nonetheless, when it comes to creating immigration policy, the policy-making process
relies on the relationship between policy actors and outcomes. Furthermore, while Europe has
generally not seen a strong radical right influence in the policy-making process, there is no
denying that radicalized right-wing parties throughout many countries in Europe have played a
role in restraining policy development, and when an extreme-right party experiences electoral
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success in a country, the result demonstrates a link to more restriction on immigration. As in the
French case, the electoral success of the extreme-right National Front party in past decades
ultimately weakened efforts throughout the country to handle the immigration issue by means of
a consensus approach toward immigration (Schain, 2006). Thus, countries defined by a
stronghold of an extremist right-wing party or radically conservative leader tend to see
constraints on the development of an agreement around immigration policy and typically
exemplify more restrictive regulations toward immigrants. Therefore, this logic supports why
Spain was defined as a country of emigration during the dictatorship underneath the radically
conservative leader, Franco.
Spain exemplifies how its break from the repressive dictatorship consequently limited the
amount of anti-immigrant rhetoric and parties supporting such anti-immigration policies that
prevailed in the new democracy. Once the Franco era came to an end, the political culture
essentially did not allow for the growth of such political organizations that promoted an antiimmigrant political agenda because, having dealt with a horrid past defined by profound division
throughout the country, the new democracy of Spain deliberately sought to shut down political
extremism from either side of the spectrum and focus on depolarization and consensus between
all of the parties (Encarnación, 2004). Having suffered abundant atrocities from everything
between the failure of the Second Republic that led to the Spanish Civil War, to the cruelties
found under the Franco dictatorship, Spain’s new democracy finally established peace and
cohesion for which the country had long-awaited. The newly constructed democratic constitution
of 1978 in Spain specifically emphasizes the importance of being a country made up of various
nationalities and ethnic and linguistic traditions, in order to be inclusive of the previously
neglected regional languages of the Basque and Catalan regions of Spain in particular
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(Encarnación, 2004). Therefore, this country saw a major shift toward more liberalized ideals in
an effort to establish cohesion among its citizens once the prolonged dominance of the
radicalized nationalistic leader finally saw its end.
Relationship between the Economy and Immigration
The 2007 global financial crisis ravaged a number of countries, reaping harsh
implications throughout Europe. While some countries have been able to bounce back more
easily than others, Spain has not experienced as much luck, continuing to hold the second highest
level of unemployment in the European Union, only second to Greece, even over a decade after
the crisis struck. While unemployment rates have been slowly but steadily declining in recent
years, unemployment rates as a percentage of the total labor force in Spain still hovered over a
staggering 15% in 2018 according to data from the World Bank. It is possible that these figures
do not even adequately represent the true extent of the level of unemployment as a result of nonparticipation in the labor market. Furthermore, in light of the refugee crisis in 2015, some
scholars claim that such demographic shifts could heavily and negatively affect the level of
unemployment in the Mediterranean region.
However, while it may be easy to dismiss immigration as primarily an economic issue,
this is not necessarily the case. The level of economic development in a country undeniably
contributes to its migration flows. Economically developed countries have an increased supply of
immigrants and demand for immigrants, and an increase in the demand for immigrant workers is
typically found in countries with low levels of unemployment and relative scarcity of unskilled
labor (Mirilovic, 2010). Nevertheless, Spain represents a large net receiver of immigrants
relative to its European Mediterranean counterparts, yet the country continues to be plagued by a
high level of unemployment. Therefore, this theory does not necessarily prove to be accurate.
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As discussed in the previous section, Spain in its newly democratic, post-Franco period
has been particularly stable and congruent in its political culture. This country, once known for
its intense polarization, has been striving for cohesion in order to ensure a well-functioning and
durable democracy. Therefore, the country seeks to solve the critical issues of the country––
immigration included––by determining the common ground between each of the parties. The
truth is that the majority of Spain’s political parties in the post-Franco era have developed the
same attitude toward immigrants, because they have determined that immigration a key facet in
upholding the economy, predominantly the agriculture, tourism, and construction sectors of the
economy (Encarnación, 2004). Immigration ultimately increases the quantity of goods and
services that a given economy is able to produce because growing the stock of labor will
naturally increase the GDP of a country (Mirilovic, 2010). Thus, such evidence negates any
claim that immigration depletes the prosperity of an economy overall, rather immigration can be
seen as a key tool in an economy’s growth.
In terms of the rhetoric around the relationship between immigration and the economy
where immigration is construed as an economic issue, the two appear to not always be so
strongly related, with opinion toward immigrants at times even being unrelated to any sort of
economic variable like that of employment status or income. Studies show that immigrants
typically occupy jobs that national citizens do not desire, so immigrants fill labor supply gaps
and improve job mobility for the nationals (Hoskin, 1991). In Spain in particular, immigrants
typically settle in low-skilled to medium-skilled jobs, like that of construction, trade, or other
service sectors, and they constitute the less-desirable occupations for Spanish nationals
(Nollenberger & Rodríguez-Planas, 2014). Attributing the economic situation as a constant and
predominant indicator of attitude toward immigration is over-simplified. Depicting an immigrant
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as a mere economic predator is either unknowingly constructing a false narrative derived from
incorrect information or, even worse, intentionally hiding legitimate economic issues behind a
façade of negative rhetoric toward immigration (Hoskin, 1991). Nevertheless, economic
downfalls, like that of the 2007 economic crisis, result in a tainted perception of migrants,
furthering the narrative of immigrants as an economic issue by falsely portraying them as a threat
to the welfare system (Berry, et al., 2016). Such economic downturns and rising national
unemployment rates have been shown to amplify anti-immigrant sentiment; nonetheless, it is the
perceived, as opposed to actual, economic competition that increases anti-immigrant sentiment in
a country (Dennison & Drazanová, 2018).
Public Opinion and Immigration: Extreme Right-Wing Parties
Public opinion is an important facet when discussing immigration. As Hoskin (1991) puts
it, it is quite likely the “single strongest influence in shaping immigration policy” (1991, 51)
given that immigration is an element of society that involves prevalent human contact that is
many times unavoidable. Thus, public opinion plays a large role in the political climate around
immigration. Public opinion also has a strong effect on the immigrants themselves, cultivating
feelings within the individual immigrants of either being desired and accepted or undesired and
feared (Hoskin, 1991). Therefore, the public opinion expressed within a studied country is
double pronged, affecting two groups: the natives of the home country and the immigrants of
such country to which they have migrated. Opinion reflects underlying attitudes, and the
individual expression of such sentiment affects the development of the public opinion of a
country as a whole. Once attitudes have been established, they tend to solidify, given that
attitudes are very contagious. The established public sentiment will likely persist and spread if
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there is no effective counteraction to ignite change, and this opinion becomes accepted as fact
(Hoskin, 1991). Attitudes are fluid, however, so they can change over time.
Europe has generally experienced a large increase in immigration ever since World War
II, thus bringing immigration to the forefront of discussion in regards to political and social
issues throughout the continent. With immigration as a leading topic of conversation in Europe
today, it is important to understand the source of public opinion on immigration. Even though
each exact element that shapes individual attitudes toward immigration is not entirely known,
many studies focus on the following factors as explanations that influence public opinion on
immigration in a country: economic, political tolerance, and sheer exposure to immigrants
(Kehrberg, 2007). These theories of influence establish a solid groundwork in determining the
development of public opinion around the topic. In examining the relationship between the level
of immigration and the economic situation, Golder’s “materialist hypothesis” claims that high
levels of immigration lead to electoral success of extreme right parties––parties that exhibit a low
tolerance for immigrants and convey negative attitudes toward immigration––only when
economic conditions are negative (Golder, 2003). This hypothesis supports the idea that a high
level of immigration in a country leads to increased support for right-wing parties that contribute
to negative public rhetoric around immigration. On the other hand, some scholars argue an
opposing relationship between levels of immigration and support for extreme right-wing parties.
Based on Gordon Allport’s theory of the “contact hypothesis,” individuals who are more exposed
to immigrants tend to see them as less threatening, given that these individuals have the
opportunity to personally interact with immigrants, and consequently, a higher level of
immigration will decrease support for an extreme right-wing party (Husbands, 2003).
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Nonetheless, pinpointing exactly what shapes public attitude toward an issue is a highly
individualized process that can be influenced by a number of factors for which are unlikely to all
be accounted, and a number of explanations still remain in terms of what may contribute to
support for extreme-right wing political parties with anti-immigrant agendas.
Conclusion
Ultimately, while causes for migration can be attributed to a number of factors, the state
of the economy and political system in a given country are two of the major players, and the
general economic prosperity and political stability of the European Union give way to a
welcoming environment for migrants. As made clear by Bover and Velilla (1999), even though
there are a number of factors that play a role in the decision to migrate, the primary motivators
can be concisely summed up into two categories: economic reasons and political reasons.
Therefore, this chapter has looked deeper into the relationships between immigration and the
system of government, as well as immigration and the economy, with a special focus on the
relationships found in Spain in particular.
Furthermore, given that this thesis places a special emphasis on the role of public
sentiment toward immigration and what causes a country to develop its attitudes toward the
matter, the influence of public opinion on immigration has been explained in further detail. One
way to examine a country’s public opinion toward immigration is to evaluate the support for
extreme right-wing parties, given their anti-immigrant rhetoric due to an emphasis on intolerance
of immigration. This chapter serves as a segway into the data and analysis of the aforementioned
variables, as the effects of the economy and the system of government in addition to the role of
public opinion will be further examined and analyzed.

31

Chapter IV
Data and Analysis
This chapter analyzes the data I have gathered, examining migration trends and public
opinion reports on immigration, as well as discussing the trajectory of anti-immigrant parties in
Spain and other European Mediterranean countries. Furthermore, it refutes the claim that a
country’s attitude toward immigrants should be determined by its economic situation, given that
the number of immigrants in a country does not correlate with the level of satisfaction with a
country’s national economy. Hence, I propose that Spain’s recent authoritarian legacy has played
a large role in contributing to its increasingly positive sentiment toward its immigrants,
specifically given the distinct nature of the Spanish transition to democracy. The first part of this
chapter focuses on the history of immigration to Spain, discussing how the country’s policies on
immigration came to fruition. In addition, this section discusses the economic crisis of 2008 and
the European migration crisis of 2015, highlighting the subsequent effects on immigration in the
country. The second part of this chapter focuses on the social attitudes toward immigration in
Spain, demonstrating Spain’s distinctive public attitude toward immigration despite the
aforementioned context. This section delves into factors potentially affecting Spain’s perception
on immigrants in order to seek answers as to why Spain’s sentiment toward immigration is so
distinctly positive, expanding upon my study by comparing Spain with a handful of other
European Mediterranean countries––France, Greece, Italy, Malta, and Portugal.
History of immigration to Spain
Spain has demonstrated a particularly distinct trajectory in regards to its modern
immigration policies in comparison with other European nation states. As a result of the
repressive dictatorship under Francisco Franco that lasted from 1939 until his death in 1975,
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immigration into the country was very constricted in terms of the number and class of
immigrants who were allowed to move to Spain (Encarnación, 2004). Therefore, Spain did not
experience a large influx of immigrants immediately following the end of the dictatorship in the
1980s and 1990s, given that the post-authoritarian society had yet to fully develop its
immigration policies. Immediately after Franco’s death that marked the end of this authoritarian
era, there was a slight increase in the number of immigrants in Spain, but the majority came from
the formerly known Spanish colonies in Latin America and neighboring European countries.
Immigration did not become a salient matter in the Spanish political agenda until more recent
years, as was the case for the other Southern European countries. Increased economic
development and political stability, as well as the geographical position as the Southern border of
the European Union, led the countries of Southern Europe to become countries of immigration.
The Spanish government passed the first immigrant regulation law, Ley Orgánica 7/1985
sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España, in July 1985, which had a very
restrictive character, emphasizing border control and establishing highly demanding sets of
requirements for the renewal of temporary work and residence permits already granted and the
development of an exceptional regularization process (Moreno, 2004). However, this strict
attitude gradually changed in the early 1990s. Since primary migrants had managed to bring their
relatives to Spain, tensions in the country rose amidst the 1990s against the 1985 Law, resulting
in rulings by different Courts that criticized aspects of the legislation and, eventually, a
Constitutional Court ruling that declared several articles of the 1985 Law unconstitutional
(Moreno, 2004). Thus, the topic of immigration emerged greatly in Spanish public opinion.
Additionally, multiple racist incidents occuring throughout the country provoked the authorities
to recognize the need to incorporate immigrant populations into Spanish society and eliminate

33

xenophobic sentiments, leading to the creation of various policies such as regularization of
undocumented immigrants and the extension of basic social rights to all immigrants (Moreno,
2004).
Therefore, Spain’s role in immigration began to greatly increase within the last couple
decades. After Spain joined the European Union in 1986 and became a member of the euro area
in 1999 and the Schengen area in 1995, the annual number of immigrants flooding into Spain has
seen a steady increase, growing from a mere 1.6% of the population in 1998 to accounting for
more than 12% of the population in 2009. The numbers began to take a downward turn the next
few years as a result of the worldwide economic crisis, but since 2015 immigration to Spain has
increased again, containing over 5,947,106 foreign-born people and accounting for 12.8% of the
population as of 2017, making Spain one of the world’s most desired countries for immigrants
(United Nations, 2019).
Figure 1. International Migrant Stock, total.

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
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As a result of the economic crisis, the labor market became polarized, restricting the
entrance of young people and immigrants for low-skilled labor jobs, so the young people,
immigrants, and lesser skilled workers were all left with a high level of job insecurity or
unemployment (Carrasco Carpio, 2017). The growing job insecurity amidst the crisis led to a dip
in the influx of immigrants coming into Spain. Many young people in Spain opted to further their
education and training as a means to improve their standing in the labor market, while others,
specifically immigrants, felt they would have more opportunity elsewhere when seeking work
(Carbonero, 2010). According to the Migration Statistics, Spain experienced its first year of a
negative migration balance in 2010, losing a great deal of its population as a result of the state of
the economy. Nonetheless, immigration into Spain would soon begin to be on the rise yet again
following the European migrant crisis in 2015.
The European migrant crisis of 2015, also referred to as the refugee crisis, consisted of
more than a million migrants and refugees crossing into Europe, consequently creating struggles
to cope with the immense quantity of migrants and division over the issue within the European
Union in terms of how to handle the crisis. This migrant crisis involved two primary routes into
Europe: the Balkan route––via Greece, Hungary, Austria to Germany––and the African route––
via Mediterranean Malta, Lampedusa, Sicily to continental Italy, France, Spain and UK––with
primarily economic refugees and migrants, but the primary driver of the migration crisis
originated from the conflict in Syria. (Krcmery, 2016). Spain in particular experienced a steep
jump in the number of migrants and refugees entering into the country between 2016 and 2017 in
comparison with its Mediterranean counterparts, Italy and Greece. When examining the total
arrivals by sea in the Mediterranean between 2016 and 2017, Italy had 119,310 arrivals in the
year 2017 as opposed to 181,436 in the previous year, and Greece had a mere 29,595 arrivals in
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2017 compared to the 173,561 arrivals in 2016, demonstrating a significant decrease; Spain, on
the other hand, saw 21,663 arrivals in the year 2017 in comparison with the mere 8,162 seen in
2016 (International Organization for Migration, 2018). Therefore, Spain is rapidly catching up to
its Mediterranean counterparts in terms of its popularity as a destination country, while countries
like Italy and Greece are explicitly accepting less migrants into their borders.
Social attitudes to immigration
Anti-immigration sentiment is one of the principal qualities that is represented in the
political platforms of extreme right-wing parties, given that such far right populist parties
generally promote a lack of tolerance for immigrants. Below is a chart that demonstrates a list of
the primary extreme right-wing political parties in each of the countries that I have discussed,
alongside the percentage of popular vote that each party won in the country’s most recent
election.
Figure 2. Extreme Right Party and Percent of Popular Vote Per Country.

Source: Psephos – Adam Carr’s Election Archive.

Studies show that there is a strong correlation between high levels of immigration in a country
and the success of the extreme right-wing party in that given country (Halla, Wager &
Zweimüller, 2016). However, it should be noted that correlation does not prove causation, so this
observation does not prove in and of itself that anti-immigration sentiment causes the success of
far right populist parties. Nonetheless, prior studies show that many people vote for extreme right
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parties due to their stance on immigration. Immigration has been found to play a more significant
role in people’s motivation to vote for such right-wing parties than economic views or protest
voting, with anti-immigrant sentiment being the main motivator in right-wing voters’ decisions,
according to a study by Elisabeth Ivarsflaten (Ivarsflaten, 2007). Other scholars have studied and
supported such claims as well, confirming that anti-immigration sentiment is the strongest
driving factor for extreme right-wing party votes. It was not until the 2018 regional elections in
Andalucía, however, that Spain’s party system saw electoral success from the radical right with
Vox gaining, and studies actually show no empirical link between immigration and the electoral
success of Vox, reporting that voters in Spain are driven to vote for Vox when desiring to limit
independence of the country’s autonomous regions like Catalonia (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019).
Furthermore, despite an increase in electoral votes in the latest election for Spain’s new
radical right-wing party, Vox, half of the population that favors right-wing parties still views
immigrants as an asset. Even among the people in Spain who are considered to be on the
ideological right side of the spectrum, 50% of them still report that immigrants make the country
stronger because of their work and talents, as can be seen in the image below.
Figure 3. Immigrants viewed more favorably among those on the ideological left.
“% who say immigrants today make our country stronger because of their work and talents”

Source: Pew Research Center. Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey.
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While France reports a large support for immigrants from those on the ideological left, there is a
much lower percentage of the ideological right population viewing immigrants as an asset, with
merely 39% from the right claiming that immigrants make the country stronger. In the case of
Spain, however, there is a much smaller difference in viewpoints between those on each side of
the ideological spectrum. Italy and Greece both report extremely low percentages of support for
immigration from both the right and the left.
The question that remains concerns precisely what it is that creates such anti-immigrant
sentiment. Two possible explanations regarding the source of such sentiment––economic
protectionism and cultural protectionism––have been proposed by Daniel Oesch. The former
claims that support for right-wing populist parties is derived from voter perception that there is a
competition between citizens and immigrants for jobs, wages, social benefits, and housing that
must be restricted; meanwhile, cultural protectionism hypothesizes that such voter support is due
to citizens’ desire to protect their national identity and oppose multiculturalism and equal rights
for foreigners (Oesch, 2008). He found that economic reasons do not have as strong of an effect
on support for the far right as does the right-wing electorate’s fear of the country’s culture being
negatively affected.
In order to test whether or not there is a relationship between the number of immigrants
in a country and the level of satisfaction with the national economy, I compared the migrant
stock as a percentage of the population with the percentage of the population that reported being
‘satisfied’ with the national economy. Given that Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) discovered
that negative attitudes toward immigration increase when there is a negative economic outlook,
and Oesch’s (2008) proposed theory of economic protectionism suggests that national citizens
are competing with immigrants for things like jobs and wages, one could assume that increased
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immigrants in a given country would decrease national citizens’ satisfaction with the country’s
economic situation (Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996; Oesch, 2008). If immigrants were in fact
stripping away opportunity for work for national citizens, then increases in the migrant stock
would consequently lead to less satisfaction with the national economy. However, I wanted to
test for this relationship in order to refute the claim that people are more satisfied with the
economy when the immigrant population decreases. I did this comparison for each country that I
have mentioned: France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain.
Figure 4. Immigration Population and Satisfaction with the National Economy.
France

Greece

39

Italy

Malta

Portugal
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Spain

Source: Eurobarometer and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

After observing the information from each country above, there appears to be no evident
relationship between the percentage of immigrants in a country and the satisfaction with the
country’s economy. As the immigrant population grows, the level of satisfaction with the
national economy does not take a downward turn.
As can be seen in Figure 5 below, despite a devastating economic crisis hitting the
country in 2008, Spain’s overall positive attitude toward its immigrants did not take a drastic dip.
Even though the level of satisfaction with the national economy in Spain plummeted around this
time, as depicted in Figure 4, Spain maintained a more positive than negative outlook on
immigration. There is a slight increase in the percentage of the population reporting a negative
attitude toward immigrants within the country immediately following the year 2008, but overall
the percentage of positive attitudes still floats above the percentage of those who reported a
negative attitude toward immigrants. While there is a lapse in the available data for the year
2013, by the time 2014 rolls around, Spain’s positive attitude toward its immigrants exemplifies
an upward trend, whereas the percentage of the country’s population reporting a negative attitude
depletes. At the onset of the European migrant crisis of 2015, positive sentiment toward
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immigrants actually began to increase rather than decrease in spite of an influx of migrants
flooding into the country. Thus, the growing number of immigrants did not seemingly cause any
sort of extreme negative backlash in the country.
Figure 5. Attitudes Toward Immigrants in Spain, 2008-2017.

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. “Actitudes Hacia la Inmigración”, 2008-2017.

Contrary to the typical internal country-level response toward immigration that was
evident in other countries in the European Union, Spain lacked a great anti-immigrant backlash
in response to growing numbers of immigrants within the country. As seen in the chart below,
the overall receptiveness towards immigrants coming into the country is significantly higher in
Spain in comparison to other European Mediterranean countries like Greece, Italy, and France.
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Figure 6. Few want to allow more immigrants.

Source: Pew Research Center. Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey.

There are multiple theories as to why this has been the case. For starters, the antiimmigrant sentiment that has emerged in other countries with an influx of immigrants throughout
Europe is typically associated with the far-right ideologies. Advocates for limited immigration,
such as the National Front in France, are described as being far-right parties (Davies, 2008).
However, in the case of Spain, there is a powerful lingering memory of the cruelties faced by the
Spanish people under the far-right dictator, Francisco Franco. Following the end of Franco’s
dictatorship in Spain, there has been a lack of strong right-wing political parties, seeing as the
legacy of the authoritarian regime under Franco left an unshakable sense of mistrust for rightwing authoritarianism that has been instilled into the Spanish people. This repressive era
imprinted a sense of reluctance toward far-right ideologies, leading to a lack of politicians to
promote anti-immigrant policies (Davies, 2008). In places where the memory of a right-wing
past is more distant, it becomes easier to adopt the nationalist ideologies, but in the case of Spain,
many of the voters and policymakers who lived amidst the Franco era are still alive today.
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Below I have created two charts, one from 2015 and one from 2019, that each compare
the migrant stock as a percentage of the total population for each country with the percentage of
the national population that reported immigration as being one of the two most important issues
facing the country.
Figure 7. Immigration as an important issue by the migrant stock as a percentage of the total
population for 2015 and 2019.

Source: Eurobarometer and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
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The only two countries that show less of a percentage of the population declaring immigration as
a principal issue than the percentage of actual immigrants in the country are Portugal and Spain.
Both of these countries dealt with long dictatorships and recent transitions to democracy.
Furthermore, Figure 8 examines country differences in whether citizens of each country
believe their country is made a better or worse place to live as a result of immigration, listing
their scores on a scale from 0 to 10. People responded to the question, “Is [country] made a
worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?” Their
responses were rated from 0––’a worse place to live’––to 10––’a better place to live.’
Figure 8. Country differences in public opinion on immigration.

Source: European Social Survey Round 1, 2002/03 and Round 8, 2016/17, extracted from OECD (2019).

In comparing these European Social Surveys from 2002/2003 data with its latest survey data
from 2016/2017, of the nineteen participating countries in the surveys, Portugal and Spain are the
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two countries of which I am studying from the chart that lie above the average, with Spain
responding more positively than Portugal in both surveys.
However, when discussing the role of this authoritarian legacy, it is interesting to
examine the effects that the dictatorship instilled on its citizens. Although the dictatorship in
Spain was characterized by many cruelties and filled with various repressive laws, the age group
of Spanish citizens who lived through Francoism and are still alive today reportedly view
immigration in a much more negative light than the younger Spanish citizens do. Thus, it seems
as if Franco indoctrinated many of his citizens with his negative ideologies around immigrants.
As seen in Figure 9, there is a stark increase from the lowest age range until reaching the group
of those ranging between the ages of 55 to 64 in regards to rating immigration as one of the
primary issues in the country.
Figure 9. Immigration as one of the principal problems, by age (2018)

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) – Barómetro Julio 2018.

The generational difference reportedly showcases the most prominent difference recorded by the
CIS between in-country groups’ viewpoints on immigration. Specifically, 16.1% of respondents
aged 55-64 have rated immigration as one of the principal problems in the country, compared to
6.7% of the youngest age group. The data rises as the age of the respondents increases, until
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reaching the retirement population. However, it will be interesting to continue examining this
trend as the older populations gradually diminish, leaving a larger gap of this authoritarian
memory in the Spanish population.
Furthermore, as a result of the immense economic crisis that affected the country a
decade ago, there could likely be a sense of understanding for those who migrate for economic
reasons to seek work abroad. Although the increased presence of immigrants in Spain could
likely negatively affect the youth population in Spain, restricting their access to low-skill jobs
that immigrants typically fill, public opinion in the country has not demonstrated strong antiimmigrant sentiments like in other countries. However, Spain has an aging native population that
will not be able to maintain the welfare state that currently protects the elderly, meaning there
must be an increase in the working population and the number of youth in the population to
create a new tax base (Sgritta, 2006). Thus, immigration could introduce this added support to
the Spanish welfare state, and the public likely recognizes this necessity.
Conclusion
As previously mentioned, a key component leading to increased support for antiimmigrant policies and an increase in overall negative public opinion toward immigration stems
from the emergence and salience of far-right ideologies within a country. Western Europe in the
past decade has notably seen an increase in voting for anti-immigration parties, exhibiting
growth in the electoral support for political parties labeled as ‘radical’, ‘far’, or ‘populist’ right,
such as the National Front in France (recently renamed the National Rally), the Northern League
in Italy, the National Renovator party in Portugal, and Vox in Spain (Dennison & Geddes, 2019).
The charts below, extracted from Dennison and Geddes’ report of the growth of anti-immigration
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political parties in Western Europe, show the polling results of each of the aforementioned
nationalist parties for the four countries between 2005 and 2018.
Figure 10. Polling for Anti-immigration Parties in Western Europe, January 2005 to June 2018.

Source: Dennison, James, and Andrew Geddes. 2019. “A Rising Tide? The Salience of
Immigration and the Rise of Anti-Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe.” The Political Quarterly 90 (1):
107-116.

Each of these parties represents a primary party within their respective country that is
unquestionably anti-immigrant in its nature, and the supporters of such parties appear to reflect
that same anti-immigrant sentiment. France and Italy have both seen an overall steadily growing
trend of support for their respective right-wing parties and experienced a significant increase in
support for these anti-immigration parties. Contrastingly, although Portugal and Spain have seen
some growth in support for their individual national parties, the overall support for such extreme
right-wing parties remains minute. Therefore, the sentiment associated with far-right ideologies
is immensely less prominent in the more recent authoritarian societies of Spain and Portugal in
contrast with older democracies like France and Italy.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Spain’s radical right-wing party, Vox, founded in
2013, has continuously gained electoral success even within the past couple years, likely
prompted by the national government’s inability to solve the political conflict in Catalonia in
light of the growing separatists movements as the autonomous region of Catalonia strives to gain
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independence from Spain (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019). Therefore, the trajectory of this up-andcoming political party in Spain is unknown, and the degree to which an increased support for
Vox and a larger representation for this right-wing party in parliament will affect public opinion
and policies around immigration is something to look out for in the coming years.
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Chapter V
Conclusion
I have presented my hypotheses in an effort to determine if Spain truly is an outlier case
in regards to its public sentiment toward immigration, and, if so, I have explored an explanation
for such a distinctive positive attitude. After assessing various scholarly literature on the topic, I
developed the hypothesis that the authoritarian legacy plays a larger role in public opinion
toward immigration than does the citizens’ perceptions on the national economy.
Following the application of comparative analysis on the evidence that I have gathered, I
have found the evidence to oppose the hypothesis that a country is less satisfied with the national
economy when the percentage of the immigrant population in the country increases. Using data
from Eurobarometer and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, I found
no pattern that linked a country’s economic satisfaction with its immigrant population.
Therefore, we can infer that there is no relationship between the level of satisfaction with a
national economy and the number of immigrants.
Following a vast discussion of the recent authoritarian regime under Francisco Franco
and its repercussions in Spain, I then suggested that Spain’s increased receptiveness toward
immigrants could likely be attributed to its recent history of dictatorship. Given that the harsh
dictatorship is still such a recent memory in Spanish society and the transition to democracy did
not occur until recent years, the country has yet to experience a return to authoritarian ideals, like
anti-immigrant sentiment. Furthermore, Spain experienced a rather seamless and evolutionary
transition to democracy, instead of dealing with a democratic transition marked by an uproar of
violence and revolutionary overthrow like in Greece and Portugal. Spain’s unique and smooth
democratic transition could provide reason as to why the country has yet to revert to its
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authoritarian ideals. Nonetheless, as the memory grows further and the legacy begins to fade, the
country could see a resurgence in the rise of the extreme right, especially given that a new
extreme right-wing party has gained some electoral success in the Spanish political system very
recently.
While this thesis took into account economic and political variables in the shaping of
public opinion toward immigration, there are still a number of other variables of which I have yet
to explore that could contribute to the development of public opinion. Social, cultural, and
environmental factors represent a few of the potential determinants that have not been explored
in this thesis.
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